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PREFACE
My Interest in Harry S. Truman's senatorial primary election
of 1940 as a thesis topic developed out of a discussion held be-
tween Truman and members of Kansas State University's Political
Science Club* As a participant In this seminar I was impressed
by the manner in which the former President answered the ques-
tions of the students. In no instance did he attempt evasion
nor did he indicate a patronizing attitude; instead he acted In
a direct and straightforward manner, answering questions with
vigorous sincerity.
This experience awakened an interest to investigate the
early political life of the individual who was reputed to be
"the man from Pendergast". It did not appear that Truman exem-
plified the popular stereotype of the machine politician. He
displayed a political sense which went beyond a simple obse-
quiousness to a political machine. A desire was aroused to
obtain a better understanding of the political nature of the
individual who rose to the office of the Presidency even though
he was closely allied with one of the most discredited political
organisations In the United States.
An inquiry into Truman's political career revealed that the
issue of Pendorgastism played an important role in the senatorial
primary election of 1940 in Missouri. During the campaign for
renominat Ion, Truman did not disassociate himself from Thomas J.
Pendergast when It seemed apparent that It would be prudent to
do so, yet Truman won the renomination* These impress iona
indicated that Truman possessed political attributes far more
important than his close connection with the Kansas City Dem-
ocratic party orgenlzation controlled by Pendergast. Therefore,
I decided to explore the 1940 senatorial primary election cam-
paign in Missouri in order to better understand the political
nature of Harry S. Truman.
Grateful acknowledgment Is made to Professors Louis H.
Douglas and Joseph Hajda of the History, Political Science, and
Philosophy Department who have contributed their valuable time
and knowledge to the final development of this study.
The author is indebted to former Governor Lloyd C. Stark
of Missouri for permission to examine his private papers.
B TRODUCTION
This study Is principally an Inquiry Into the political
nature of Harry S. Truman. The selection of a party primary
afforded an opportunity to observe the practical politician In
his own element, the political arena. The paper concerns Itself
with the situations and circumstances involved In an actual
polltloal contest and how the political combatants reacted to
these realities. The Intention Is not to analyze the voting
behavior of fclw Missouri electorate, but rather to note how the
successful politician reaots within his own sphere.
The direct primary concept attempted to Introduce t greater
degree of popular democracy Into the nominating process. It was
believed by the reform-minded that machine politicians and
behind-the-scenes organization maneuverlngs would diminish when
control of the nominating procedure was placed In the hands of
the people. Organized machine politics played an integral role
in the Missouri Democratic senatorial primary race of 1940,
largely because candidate Harry 3. Truraan was an active member
of the Kansas City Democratic organization, owned and controlled
by Thomas J. Pendergast.
CHAPTER I
THE RISE AND 7ALL OP THOMAS J. PENDERGAST
Thomas J. Pendergast arrived In Kansas City from St. Joseph,
Missouri, In 1890. He was summoned there by his older brother,
Jim Pendergast, to assist In the latter's business activities.
The elder Pendergast was a political figure of some note; he
was a member of the city council and had begun the creation of
the political organization which his younger brother would
develop Into the most dominant Influence In state politics. Tom
Pendergast immediately entered Into political activity by becom-
ing a precinct worker, thus starting the climb upward to political
dominance. His progress was ra^ld and upon the death of his
brother Jim in 1911, Tom assumed leadership of the "goat" fac-
tion of the Democratic party in Kansas City. 1
In the political battles that Tom Pendergast encountered In
his rice to power he developed a practical philosophy of action.
In an Interview with Ralph Coghlan, Pendergast stated:
There are no alibis in politics. The delivery of votes
la what counts. And It is efficient organization In every
little ward and precinct that determines national as well as
looal elections.
. • All the ballyhoo and showmanship such
as they have at the national conventions is all right. It's
a great show. It gives folks a run for their money. It
makes everyone feel good. But the man who makes the organi-
1. For an account of Thomas J. Pendergast 's political
career see, Maurice M. Mllllgan, Missouri Waltz (New York: Charles
Scrlbner's Sons, 1948), pp. 44-68.
sat ion > oaslble la the man who delivers the votes* end he
doesn't clelivor them by oratory, lolltlcs la a business,
just like anything else. 2
True to this business-like concept of politics, iendergast
built a machine oepable of delivering large majorities for the
candldate8 he favorod. In the Demooratlo primary election of
^at 7, 1934, when rendergast supported Harry S. Truman for
the aenatorlal nomination, he was able to provide Truman with a
Jackson County vote of 157,529 while Truman's two opponents in
the race garnered a oombined total of only 10,437 votes.
When these electoral figures are compared with the results
of the August 6, 1940, Democratic aenHtorlai primary race in
which Truman again was a participant we note that Truman waa
able to poll only 49,974 votes whereas his two adversaries went
on to obtain a oombined total of 55,413 votes.4 The latter was
the first state-wide election held since the 1 ^ riaonment of
T. J. Pendergast in May of 1939. Another indication of the
Jaokaon County machine's ability to produce the vote for can-
didetes who had obtained the support of Pendergast can be
noted by looking at the a loot ion results of the Democratic
gubernatorial primary of 1^36. In thla race the Kansas City
organization threw Its support behind Lloyd C. Stark. Stark
proved so popular In the Jaokson County area that he received
2. Ralph Coghlan, "Boss Penderrast" Forum and Century ,
XCVII (February, 1937),p.70.
3. Missouri, Seoretary of State, Official Manual State of
Mlaaouri 1935-36, compiled by Dewight H. Brown (Jefferson City,
1937), p. 4l0. "
4. Miaaourl, Official Manual State of Missouri, 1941-1942 ,
p. 366.
168,724 votes while his Democrat io opponent in the primary race
obtained 3,785. Thla oontest clearly illustrated the power
whioh the iendergant organization could muster come election day.
Two incidents contributed heavily to the elevation of
der ust to the high position he held in Missouri politics.
One was the election of Joseph B. Shannon to the House of Rep-
resentatives and the other was a veto exercised by Missouri's
chief executive.
Joseph E. Shannon was "Boss" Tom's chief rival in Jackson
County Democratic politics. Shannon was the leader of the
"rabbit" faction of the Democratic party and in th^e capacity
ed continuous warfare with lendergast *s "goat" faction. When
Shannon decided to run for Congress in 1W30 lendergast eaperly
supported his candidacy and as a result became the sole political
strong man on the Kansas City scene when Shannon went on to vic-
tory in the election.
The second situation which paved the way for Pendergaat to
extend his Influence came about when Governor Caulfield vetoed
the Congressional redisricting act passed by the Missouri leg-
islature. The Governor's veto necessitated the eleotlng of Con-
gressmen at large in 1U3l. because of this situation, potential
candidates for Congress came to court the favor of the man who
oould provide large majorities in Kansas City. The results of
5. Missouri, Tidal Manual State of Missouri, 1957-193B ,
p. 354.
6. Milligan, Missouri Waltz, p. 75.
this election ere enlightening for they highlight the power of
the Jackson County machine. Of the ten individuals who obtained
the support of Penderrast Jn the primary election, nine were
nominated in the primary and eventually went on to victory in
the general election. Therefore, of the thirteen r.en who made
up the Missouri delegation to the House of Representatives, nine
paid homage to the Jackson County loader. Pendergast's Influence
now reached into the outstato regions of Missouri and the news-
papers began to refer to the Hovernor's Mansion in Jefferson
City as "Uncle Tom's Cabin".
The election of 1W56 was the Mght.oint of Pendergast power
but it also was the election which started the decline of "Boss"
Pendergast from his high position in Missouri politics. It had
taken Thomas J. Pendergast forty-six years to reach his position
of political dominance but in less than three years he would be
incarcerated in the Federal prison at Leavenworth, Kansas.
In 1926, a Citizens Committee was formed and carried on an
investigation concerning suapeoted voting Irregularities. This
Investigation took place prior to the 19S6 elections and when
the group had accumulated enough evidence they requested United
States District Judge Merrill E. Otis to empanel a grand Jury.
The judge advised the lntore ted citizens to turn their evidence
over to the United States District Attorney, Maurice M. Milllgan. 8
7. John H« Fenton, Politics in the Border States (Hew
Orleans; The Hauser Press, 1U&7), rr . l^-lSS.
«. Milllgan, Mlsamrl Waltz, p. 145.
aMllllgan' s office was powerless to act until 8 crime had
been oommitted and a federal statute violated. The election of
1956 was held and passed without Incident, hut behind the soenes
the United States District Attorney's offioe in Kansas was moving
into action. After a preliminary investigation of the election
returns the United States district Attorney believed that It
was time to call a grand jury. 9
Mllllgan had to locate a federal statute which permitted
his office to act. He came up with a Civil Rights Statute which
was passed after the Civil War. The statute states
t
If two or more persons conspire to Injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any citizen In the free exercise
or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because
of his having exorcised the same • . . they shall be fined
not Korg than £5,000 or Imprisoned not more than ten years
• • *
Mllllgan believed that this statute had been violated and that
It would empower his office to prosecute.
The District Attorney's first act was to petition for Is-
suance of a court order which enabled the Federal Marshal to
impound all election records, books, ballots, and ballot boxes
.•.hi eh were under the care of the local election board. With the
aid of the Federal Bureau of Invest lrat Ion these Impounded election
materials were carefully analyzed for Irregularities.
9. Ibid ., ... 140-147.
1". U.S., Code , Title 18, Chap. IS (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment ir lntlng Office, 1959), IV, 3207.
11. Mlllifran, Missouri ftaltz, p. 150.
In January, 1937, the grand jury handed down its first
Indictment Involving twenty Individuals and, before the elec-
tion fraud cases wers to end two years later, District Attorney
Mllllgan and his associates were to convict 269 persons out of
a total of 278 defendants. Nineteen defendants were dismissed
for various reasons but not one person was aoqultted by the
IP
Judge or Jury.
The Jackson County machine was In disrepute and the trials
Indicated that upwards of 50,000 "ghost" votes were on the
county voting lists. 13 These "ghost" votes sometimes were cast
for people deceased. In other lnstanoes as a result of fraudulent
registration. While the machine had come under heavy attack from
the Federal Government, the leadership In the person of Thomas
J. Pendergast was not immediately affected by these voting
frauds.
The specific Issue which brought down Pendergast from his
perch as political overlord of the State of Missouri was an In-
surance rate scandal. On December 30, 1929, the fire insurance
companies In the State of Missouri Informed the State Superintend-
ent of Insurance, Joseph B. Thompson, that a rate Increase of 16 2/3
per oent was going into effect. The Superintendent of Insurance
did not approve this Increase, but the companies proceeded to
oollect the new rate on their policies. The companies also sought
an injunction in the United States District Court to prevent the
12. Ibid ., p. 166.
13. Ibid., p. 158.
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Superintendent from Interfering in the collection of the in-
creased rates.
The court ordered that the money collected by the increased
rate be impounded while the contending parties were locked in
litigation. Robert Emmet t C'Malley, who was appointed Superin-
tendent of Insurance in 1935, entered into negotiation with the
insurance companies and in May of 1935, reached a settlement
with the companies. This settlement ended the litigation and
the Impounded premiums , whloh now totaled more than $9,000,000,
were to be distributed in such a manner that the insurance com-
panies would receive 80 per cent of the impounded money and the
polioy holders 20 per cent. The court approved this settlement
and ordered the impounded money to be distributed as agreed upon
15by the two parties.
This agreement apparently ended the long battle between the
State of Missouri and the lnsuranco companies, but a retiring
official of the Department of Internal Revenue confided to a
reporter of the Kansas City Star about certain irregularities
which were discovered concerning the income tax statement filed
by the law firm of Hioks and Felonie. This firm acted as oounsel
for the fire insurance companies in the contest over increased
Insurance rates.
14. Maurice M. Milllgan, "Statement of Facts to the Court
in the Case of the United States v. T. J. Fendergast Ko. 14567."
"these facts were presented in Kansas City Missouri, May 22, 1939.
15. Ibid .
16. MTTTigan, Missouri ^faltz, p. 171.
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The irregularities involved checks from fourteen Insurance
companies totaling $100,600 which had heen nade payable to the
17law firm and forwarded to Charles R. Street. Street was an
official of one of the insurance oompanies and acted as the chief
representative of the insurance companies in their litigation
with the State of Missouri. When Street was questioned concern-
ing whether he received the money, he answered in the affirmative
but would not divulge the name of the person to whom he claimed
he had passed the money. Later, Street informed the Department
of Internal Revenue by letter that he could not make known the
name of the recipient of the money until the ocean liner Queen
Mary docked in New York City. The passenger list of the liner
indicated that T. J. Pendergast was a passenger.
This was the information that the Star reporter received
from the retiring governmental official and which he immediately
related to Governor Lloyd C. Stark of Missouri. The Governor
Informed District Attorney Mllllgan about the affair and a con-
ference was held in Washington, D. C«, to discuss the entire
situation. It was decided at this conference to undertake a
19
complete investigation into the entire insurance case.
The investigation revealed that a deal had been made between
Pendergast and Street in which a settlement favorable to the in-
surance companies was reached. The original price agreed upon
17. Mllllgan, "Statement of Facts".
18. Ibid.
19. MTTTigan, Missouri Walts, p. 173.
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by Pendergast and Street was ? 500, 000; Inter this flfure was
po
raised to 5750,. 00 payable to T. J. endergast. The Individual
who was the messenger between Street and I endergast was A* L.
MoCormaok of St. Louis. WcCorraaok was the past president of the
Missouri Fire Insurance Agent's Association and was the person
who finally related the entire sordid Insurance rate scandal to
Maurice M. Million, the federal District Attorney. 21 Million
obtain* d the facta of the bribery from McCorraaok when he brought
pressure to bear on the executives of the fourteen Insurance
companies Involved. The biatrial Attorney threatened to involve
all of the lnsuranoe officials In the case, If the name of the
Individual who eventually received the noney was not ^orthcomlnr.
The threat to embarrass the lnsuranoe exeoutlvas proved successful
and MoCormaok was persuaded to tell all he knew concerning the
22transactions between Street and Penderr^ot.
McCormack told how he, at different times, conveyed a total
of $440,000 to lenderrast, of which Pendergast kept '.'15,000 and
distributed tha rest between MoCorrrack and Su--er?n*ondenfc of
Insurance O'Malley. The renainln- /.>310,000, due Penderj-ast from
the agreement reached with Street, was not paid because of the
death of Street before the transaction could be completed.*^
Whan Penderpast's Income tax returns for the years 1935 and
1936 were checked It was noted that the money he received from
20. Mllli-an, "Statement of paota".
21. 1111 -an, Missouri Waltz
, p. 180.
8£. Ibid ., P . TF5Z
23. Milllgan, "Statement of Pacts".
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Street was not declared. The federal government had a clear
case of income tax evasion against the dominant political figure
in the State of Missouri* Pendergast was indicted on income tax
evasion but before the case came to trial he pleaded guilty to
the charge and threw himself on the mercy of the court.
Thomas J* Pendergast was sentenced to serve fifteen months
in Leavenworth Penitentiary and fined $10,000. He was further
ordered to pay to the United States Treasury $434,000 for unpaid
back taxes. 25
When Pendergast had served his sentence he was paroled from
prison and placed on probation. The probation ruling prevented
Pendergast from engaging in politics, and because he was techni-
cally a felon, his rights of citizenship were temporarily
revoked.
This was a severe set back to the man who was the dominant
power in Missouri Democratic politics, but his name and what it
represented still played a key part in the Missouri Democrat ic
primary of 1940.
24. Ibid .
25. Mllligan, Missouri Waltz
, p. 201.
23. Ibid., p. 2l2~.
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CHAPTER II
PROFILES OP THE CANDIDATES
All three of the candidates for the Democratic senatorial
nomination, Harry S. Truman, Lloyd C. Stark, and Maurice M.
Milligan were inextricably involved with the forces of Pender-
gastism. Truman, the incumbent senator, was a member of the
Pendergast organization and his two opponents in the campaign.
Stark and Milligan, both decided to unseat Truman by waging a
vigorous campaign against Pendergast ism. The relationships
which the three antagonists had with Pendergast can be better
understood when profiles of the candidates are compared.
Harry S. Truman
In 1934, after T. J. Pendergast had consolidated his con-
trol over Kansas City by supporting his chief rival Joseph B.
Shannon for Congress and extending his Influence into the out-
state regions by capitalizing on the Governor's veto of the
redistrlcting act, Truman was the nominee backed by the Pender-
gast organization for United States Senator* He was nominated
in the primary election In August, 1934, and went on to victory
in the November election with a majority of 262,000 votes over
his Republican opponent*
1. Missouri, Official Manual State cf Missouri, 1941-42
,
p. 53.
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Harry S. Truman was born in Lamar, Missouri, on May 8, 1884;
his family moved to Independence, Missouri In 1890. He began
his education in the Independence public schools in 1892 and
graduated from high school in 1901. On June 14, 1905, Truman
joined the Missouri National Guard and became a charter member
of Battery B. He went on active military duty as a First
Lieutenant of Field Artillery on September 26, 1917, and served
with valor in France during World War I. At the cessation of
hostilities Truman was discharged from the military service with
the rank of Major.
Returning to his home in Independence, Truman entered poli-
tics and was elected Judge of Jackson County Court on November,
1922. Although defeated for re-election In 1924, Truman won the
office of Presiding Judge of the Jackson County Court in 1926, and
was re-elected to this office In 1930.
The office of county judge in Missouri Is not of a judicial
nature. It is concerned primarily with administrative matters
of the county, comparable to the functions of county commissioner
in Kansas. Truman in his capaolty as county judge was successful
and efficient. The Kansas City Times had this to say for Judge
Truman, when he sought re-election in 1930:
Judge Truman is running for re-election. He has given
the county an able, honest and efficient administration.
We believe he should be re-elected on his record especially
in the efficient and economical expenditure of the $6,500,000
2. Ibid., p. 53.
16
rood fund . . . rflcient, unselfish public service is not
so common that it should be dispensed with merely for
partisan reasons. The faithful and competent public serv-
ant shoula be retained In office.*
As far as his future political career was concerned this position
afforded little opportunity for further political advancement.
Truman, however* held at the same tlae an auxiliary position as
State Re-employment Director. This position gave him an oppor-
tunity to extend his influence outsi e the confines of Jackson
County, but this was still not enough to warrant his selection
ss the organisation's candidate for United States Senator.
Pendergast had difficulty in persuading individuals to run
in the primary. He first offered his sup ort to former United
States Senator, James Heed. When Heed refused the candidacy,
Pendergast turned to his old rival Joseph B. Shannon, a member
of the House of he presents t Ives. Shannon also declined the
offer of Pendergast. When Shannon refused, Pendergast attempted
to convince James P. Aylward, the State's Democratic party chair-
man, to run for the nominatin. Aylward considered the proposal
but eventually turned it down. At last the organization turned
4
to the Jackson County Judge.
Truman earlier had sought the aid of Pendergast in securing
the Democratic nomination for governor but had been turned down.
He accepted the off -r of Pendergost to seek the nomination for
United States Senator. His chief opponents in the primary were
3. Kansas City Times , October 17, 1930, p. 3.
4. Jonathan Daniels, The Man of Independence (New York:
J.B. Lippinoott Company, 1950 ) pp. 16f-16H.
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Congressman J. L. Mllligan, a brother of the United States
District Attorney Maurice Mllligan, and Congressman John J.
Cochran of St. Louis.
Mllligan had the support of Bennett Clark, who had chal-
lenged the Pendergast organization In 1932, hy winning the
nomination for United States Senator on the Democratic ticket
against the organization candidate Charles M. Howell. Cochran
was well hacked in St. Louis and had the support of the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch . 6
In the campaign Truman was an avid defender of the Roosevelt
Administration, while his opponents attacked him on his connection
with the Kansas City political organization of Thomas J. Pender-
gast. Truman won the race with a 40,745 vote margin over his
8
nearest rival, John J. Cochran of St. Louis. In the general
election of 1934, Truman went on to defeat the Republican incum-
o
bent Senator, Roscoe C. Patterson, by a majority of 262,156 votes.
Truman arrived in Washington an avowed advocate of the New
Deal, and during his first term as United States Senator from
Missouri he consistently voted for the Administration's program. 10
5* Ibid ., p. 162.
6. Ibid
-
., p. 170.
7. Ibid .
8. Missouri, Official Manual State of Missouri, 1935-1936 ,
p. 411.
9. Ibid ., p. 299.
10. See roll call vote on: (1) Labor Relations Act, U.S.
Congressional Record , 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1935, LXXIV, Part 9,
p. 1962; (2i Social Security Act ( Ibid .), Part 9, p. 9650; (3)
Soil Conservation Act, U.S. Congressional Record , 74th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 1936, LX.XX, Part 2, p. 2165; (4; Pair Labor Standards
Act, U.S. Congressional Record , 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1937,
LXXXI, Part 7, p. 7957.
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A major exception developed when T.J. Pendergast, through the
urging of the White House, requested Truman to cast his vote
for Alben Barkley for majority leader of the Senate. Truman had
promised his vote to Fat Harrison of Mississippi and because of
this fact turned down Pendergast 's request and voted for the
Mississippi Senator. Truman stated that this was the first time
that Pendergast requested a favor of him since he became
Senator.
Truman became irritated by this behind-the-scenes activity
of the White House. He resented the fact that the White House
refused him the ordinary senatorial courtesy which he expected,
informing Stephen Early that he hoped the Executive Branoh was
cognizant of the fact that he was the Senator representing the
12State of Missouri.
Truman, as a freshman Senator, served on two major standing
13
committees, Interstate Commerce and Appropriations. Although
he was the lowest ranking Democrat on both committees, he ren-
dered Important service in connection with the passage of the
Transportation Act of 1940. **
During the time Truman was In Washington, the organization
which lifted him out of obscurity and placed him in the United
States Senate was encountering numerous difficulties. With the
11. William P. Helm, Harry Truman (New York: Duell, Sloan
and Pearoe, 1947), pp. 48-5l^
12. Ibid ., p. 53.
13. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman; Year of Decisions ,
I, p. 147.
14. See Senate debates, U.S. Congressional Record , 76th Cong.,
3rd. Sess., 1940, LXXXVI, Part 10, pp. 11537-11547.
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disclosures of the 1936 voting frauds fend the conviction of Thomas
J* Pendergast on charges of income tax evasion, the Kansas City
organisation had become a symbol of corruption* When the voting
scandals were disclosed, Truman remained silent. The only time
that he spoke out officially concerning the matter was when
Maurice M. Milligan 'a name came up before the Senate for re-
nomination aa Federal Mstrlct Attorney for the 'Aestern District
of Missouri. The exchange of remarks between senators Truman,
Bridges and Clark during the debate over this re-confirmation
of Milligan brought into perspective the atmosphere which en-
veloped the Kansas City politioal soene in 1938. The Congres -
sional hecord contains the following aocount of the debate t
Mr. Truman .
Mr. Milligan is now undvr consideration for confirma-
tion on a reappointment. I have never thought, and I do
not now think, that Mr. Milligan is qualified for the posi-
tion of district attorney for the western district of Mis-
souri. He 1b net professionally qualified, nor is he
morally qualified.
My opposition to Mr. Milligan began long before vote
frauds were brourht to light in Kansas City. His morals
and his politioal thinking never appealed to me.
The l-resldent has appointed nin and the President
wants him confirmed because of a situation in Kansas City
due to vote fraud prosecutions In the Federal Court. Mr.
Milligan has been made a hero by the Kansas City Star and
the St. Louis Post-Dispatch as a result of these prosecu-
tions. The implication has been that any capable lawyer I
would recommend for di strict attorney In western Missouri
would net do his duty in regard to vote frHud proseoutions.
livery good lawyer and decent citizen in Kansas City and
Jackson County is Just as strongly op osed to vote frauds
as are the Kansas City Star and Mr. Milligan.
20
Mr. Bridges .
-es the Senator think that because a man has done his
duty and prosecuted those guilty of vote frauds* some of
the worst In the Nation, he ought to be penalized now?
Mr. Truman .
No; I do not. I have never asked that he be penalized.
I asked that he be made special prosecutor to continue these
prosecutions, and that a district attorney be appointed in
Kansas City who was agreeable to the Democrats in that
community. . • .">
Truman wont on In his answer to Bridges to castigate the part
played by the Federal Judges In Kansas City.
. . . The Federal Court at Kansas City is p resided over by
two as violently partisan Judges as have ever sat on a Fed-
eral benoh slnoe the federalist judges of Jefferson's tdmln-
istration. They are Meiill K. Otis and Albert L Reeves.
Mr. Reeves was appointed by that great advocate of clean
nonpartisan government, Warren 0. Hardinr, and Mr. Otis was
appointed by that other great progressive nonpartisan,
Calvin Coolidge. 16
Truman also made mention of the fact that he thought it im-
proper on Mllllgan's part to accept fees from bankruptcy oases
in a court where he represented the Federal Government an dis-
trict attorney. Truman went on to Inform the Senate that
... a Jaokson wounty, Mo., Democrat has as much chance of
a fair trial in the Federal District Court of Western Mis-
souri as a Jew would have in a Hitler court or a Trotsky
follower before iitalin. Indictments have been wholesale.
Convictions have beon a foregone conclusion. Verdicts have
been directed. This Is Federal court justice in western
Missouri, on the face of it a conspiracy between the par-
tisan Federal ju-Jres and their bought and paid for district
attorney .J-7
15. U.8., Congressional Record , 75th. Con^., 3rd. Seas.
1938, LXXXIII, Pert 2, p. 1965.
16. Ibid .
17. TFTff., p. 1963.
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Later on In the debate Senator Bridges, a Republican, went
on to defend the oholoe of the President. He told the Senate
that he had two pictures from the Missouri Non-iart5san Hews of
October 23, 1936, which Illustrated the scale on which vote fraud
had taken place In Kansas City. One of these pictures portrayed
a residence at 912 Tracy Street, Kansas City, Mlrsourl. This
residence was the hone for 141 registered voters. The other
photo was of a vacant lot at 700 Main Street, Kansas City, Mis-
souri. This vacant lot was the reported address of 112 voters,
i ridges continued on In this vein until Senator Bennett C. Clark
of Missouri was recognised. ia
Clark commented that he and Senator Truman were n.w on
cordial terms despite the fact that Clark did not support Truman
in the 1934 primary, but he went on to challenge the assertion
that Maurice M. Hllllgsn was of a low moral character. Truman
claimed that he was not inferring that 2. 1 11 lion's private morals
were in question, but that his public morals were under suspicion
because he had accepted emoluments from a court In which he had
to try cares. Clark stated that he was -lad Truman made this
distinction between private and public morals but continued to
defend the man he first nominated for the position of District
Attorney. The Senate finally confirmed Mllllgan for a second
term as District Attorney of Western Missouri, with Truman voting
19
against the confirmation.
IB. Ibid .
19. bid., p. 1964
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Lloyd Crow Stark
Lloyd Crow Stark was born on a farm In Pike County, Missouri,
on November 25, lBb6. lie beg.an his education in the public
schools and was appointed to the United States Naval Academy at
Annapolis, Maryland, by Champ Clark. After graduation from the
Academy in 1908, he embarked on a four-year tour of sea duty*
In 1912, he resigned his commission and returned to Pike County,
entering the family nursery business.
After the United States entered World War I, Stark offered
his services and was commissioned a captain in the Field Artillery.
lie served with distinction in France, was discharged from the
military service in 1919 with the rank of major and then returned
10
to civilian life and became prominent in local civic affairs.
In • meeting with T. J. Pendergast on October 15, 1935, at
Pendergast's politic;. 1 headquarters in Kansas City, Stark obtained
his endorsement for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination.
Pendergast stated that "Major Stark has more independent strength,
in my opinion, than any other candidate. I think he will make
21
Missouri a splendid governor." In 195(5, as Democratic nominee,
22
Start won the governship by a majority of over 250,000 votes.
Stark's opponent in the Democratic primary was William Hirth,
20. Missouri, Official Manual Stbte of Missouri, 1959-1940 ,
p. 11.
21. Kansas City Star , October 16, 1^35, p. 1.
22. Missouri, orflcTal Manual Stale of Missouri, 1959-1^40 ,
p. 11.
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publisher of the Missouri Farmer * Hlrth later stated that he
expected Stark would "go along" with the machine, that Is, that
Stark would permit the Fendergast organization to dictate his
chief appointees and to have a controlling voice In Important
State policies.
After Stark defeated Hlrth In the primary and went on to
victory In the general election, It looked as If Pendergast was
In complete control of the Executive Mansion In Missouri* How-
ever, this Impression was misleading.
In 1937, Governor Stark backed two pieces of legislation
whloh had a direct effect on the political situation In Kansas
City. One was a measure designed to provide for permenant
registration of voters and for holding of elections In all cities
of 600,000 or more Inhabitants, 2* and the other a bill providing
for registration of voters and holding of elections In all cities
of 300,000 to 700,000 Inhabitants. 25 These two measures also
provided for the establishment of a four-member bi-partisan
election board. The selection was to be determined by the number
of votes that each party polled at the last general election for
Governor. The party with the highest total of votes was to have
two representatives on the board and the party with the next
highest total of votes was to have the remaining two positions*
23. William Hlrth, The Missouri Farmer , (campaign literature
located at the Missouri State Historical Society, Columbia, Mis-
souri, 1937).
24. Missouri, Laws of Missouri , H. B. 234. 59th General
Assembly, (1937), p. 235.
26. Ibid., p. 296.
MThe Governor was to appoint the Individuals for terns of four
years. The two bills became law en June 50, 1937. 26
The first instance of difference between the Governor and
the Kansas City "Boss" developed at a conference which took
place in Colorado L^vin^s, Colorado, in the Summer of 1937.
Pendergast requested the reappointment of Pred Bellemere and
feor:*e V. Aylward as the two Democrats en the Xansat City elec-
tion board* Stark turned down Penderpast 's request by claiming
27he desired to handle this matter personally.
Also at the meeting , Pendergast desired the reappointment
of R. Emraett O'Maliey to the position of Superintendent of
Insurance. Stark compromised on this issue and stated he would
retain 0' Mel ley for one year with the understanding that Pender-
gast would submit the names cf three individuals who could be
considered as a replacement for O'Maliey. Disregarding the
agreement, Stark summarily removed O'Maliey and appointed George
28
A. S. Robertson in his plaoe. In October 1937.
The real break between Stark and Pendergast came about when
on October 2£, 1937, Stark appointed men to the election board
who were not favorable to Pendergast. The election board ap-
pointees were J. £• Woodmansee, Democrat, as chairman, Edward
Shook as associate Democratic member, and Bruce "orester and
Lewis Ellis as Republican members. Pendergast said that Stark
26. Ibid .
27. Kansas City Star , April 1, 193B, p. 1.
Ibid.
25
named "one Democrat and three Republicans to the bi-partisan
board." Pendergaat considered Tfoodmansee an able Democrat. 29
This election board proceeded to employ application forms
in registering voters instead of compiling the new list from the
old registration books. This new system onabled the board to
check the names of the voters tered. After the municipal
election of March 29, 1938, the elect! rn board claimed a clean
election had been held in Kansas City and they estimated that
60,000 to 70,000 "ghost" votes had been purged from the voting
lists.30
It was after this election that Pendergaat publicly de-
nounced Stark <n an interview with reportere. He went M to
admit that it was the Governors duty to nt the election
commissi MS rs, but he claimed that It should have been bi-parti-
san. "I re-assert with all my vigor I have in mf heart that he
31did not do it." l-endergaat claimed that during the recent
municipal election In Kansas City, Stark permitted his name to
be linked with the enemies of the Democratic 1'arty and never at-
tempted to deny it. "Now oftor the election Is over he says he
is always glad when the Democratic party is successful."38
Pendergast doubted the sinoerlty of the Governor by statin :
I cannot subscribe to the honesty of that statement,
and will have to take it with a grain of salt. In conclu-
sion, let me say that he will have to live with his ci. -
29. Kansas City Times , March 30, 193b, p. 1,
so * p ld *31. Kan 8as City Star , April 1, 1938, p. 1.
32. Ibid.
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science the same as the rest of us. If hit conscience Is
clear— I know m j.ne i a . I now say let the river take Its
course.*'
Thus Pendergast out Stark off from the organization and paved
the way for open warfare with the Governor. The first battle in
this struggle between the Kansas City organization and Stark
took place over tlM election of a Judge to the State Supreme
Court In 1933. Judge James M. Douglas was an appointee of Gover-
nor Stark to fill an unexpired term on the State Supreme Court. 5*
He filed for election to the court and was backed wholeheartedly
by Stark. The Pendergast organization threw its support behind
James V. Billings. The primary campaign was vigorously fought
with James M. Douglas emerging victorious. Billings polled
312,746 votes to Douglas's 432, 244. 38 This election was a dam-
aging blow to the Pendergast organization and it was evident that
Stark registered an important victory over his rival.
The coup do grace of Stark* a attack on tho Pendergast organi-
zation came about when Stark, on March 23, 1939, before a joint
session of the Missouri General Assembly, requested that the leg-
islature create a board of Police Commissioners for Kansas City
to be appointed by the Governor. The legislature was designed to
remove local control of the Police Department and place it in the
hands of the State Executive. In his speech Stark claimed:
A pplice department controlled by machine politicians
entirely and therefore answerable only to such a political
33. Ibid .
34. TFT3" .
35. Missouri, Official Manual State of Missouri, 1939-1940
,
p. 348.
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machine quickly becomes fa vloloua unci intolerable thing*
The police department of Kansas City has become a signal
anci notorious failure* As a police department it has
virtually ceased to function. It nas beco e the instrumen-
tality of politicians who prostitute it to achieve their
own political aims. 56
The bill proposing the creation of a board of police com-
missioners in cities of 20C.0G0 to 500,000 inhabitants, with the
novernor having the authority to appoint four members for four-
year terms, was passed by the lerislature end was signed by the
37Governor on July 8, 1939.
Maurice "orton Milliran
Maurice orton iillipan was born on a farm in Ray County,
Missouri, on November 23, 1884. As a youth In the Richmond,
Missouri, school system he was p r ltted to recess his school
work so thst he might serve as clerk in the State Senate. In
this ^o;=ition he early encountered the rules and regulations of
the fame of politics. During his high school days In Richmond
he be^an studying law and as a result was admitted to the bar the
day after graduation from high school. This fact did not pre-
vent Mililgan from continuing on to Law School at the University
38
of Missouri from whioh he graduated in 1908.
j»fter graduating from law school, Mllllnan returned to
36. Missouri, Journal of the House of Representatives , 60th
General Assembly, (1939), p. 616.
37. Missouri, Laws of Missouri, B.B. 668. 60th General
Assembly, (1939), p. 64S.
38. Milllpan, Missouri Kelts, pp. 4-7.
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practice law In Richmond, Missouri* He Immediately entered
politics and was elected city attorney. In 1915 he was elected
Judge of the Probate Court and served In this capacity until
1923.39
On February 3, 1934, Mllllgan was appointed United States
District Attorney for the Western District of Missouri by Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt. It was from this position that
Maurice M. Mllllgan catapulted himself Into a prominent position
In Missouri politics.*
Early In his career In Kansas City, Mllllgan became In-
volved In the case known as the "Union Station Massacre." On
June 17, 19o3, a captured ex-convlct, Frank "Jelly" Nash was
being escorted by three law enforcement agents Into the Union
Station at Kansas City. They were met by other law officers and
this entire group proceeded to the station parking lot. The
prisoner and his escorts were stopped by three armed men who
began firing on the police offlolals. The result of the firing
was the death of five men: Chief of Police Otto Reed of McAlester,
Oklahoma, police officers W. J. Grooms and Frank Hermanson of
Kansas City, Special Agent Raymond J. Caffery of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and Ironically enough the ex-convlct
Frank "Jelly" Nash. Nash was the Individual the three armed men
41
were attempting to free from police custody.
39. Ibid ., p. 8.
40. bid., p. 3.
41. Ebla"., pp. 111-112.
I
.
The three rrrr.ed men involved in this mass murder were Verne
Miller, "Pretty Boy" Plojrd, and Adam lilchettl, all notorious
criminals. Miller and Floyd met with violent deaths, and Richetti,
after hla capture in Ohio* waB returned to Kansas City where he
was tried and convicted for his partic! pat Ion in the "Massacre"
and eventually put to death. Milligan's office played an integral
part in the investigation and eventual solution of the mystory
which surrounded the "Union Station Massacre". This was ?!Illigan f s
first involvement with the many spectacular court oases which, In
42
his capacity as District Attorney, he encountered in Kansas City.
Milligan played a central role in the many vote fraud cases
which ended in the convict ijn of 269 persons out of a total of
278 defendants. Ho reached the pinnacle of his career in the
insurance rt»te case which led to the eventual imprisonment of
T. J. Pendergast. Thus in his role of District Attorney,
Mllllr;an performed his duties in such a manner that he beoeme a
nationally known "pang buster" and a man to be reckoned with in
State politics*
42. Ibid., pp. 118-133.
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CHAPTER III
THE CAMPAIGN
The Incumbent Senator, Harry S. Truman was faced with seri-
ous opposition In the Democratic primary race. Lloyd C. Stark
waged a successful campaign to clean out the forces of Pender-
gastlsm in Kansas City while Maurice M. Mllllgan had the singu-
lar accomplishment of bringing about the actual confinement of
T. J. Pendergast. Truman had to make profitable use of his
political expertness In the primary campaign In order to over-
come the obstacles laid In the way of renomlnatlon.
Early ~n 1940 Harry S. Truman decided to fight for the re-
nomlnatlon In the August primary and for re-election In the
November general election. He based his decision on what he
called specific reasoning:
I had worked hard. I had worked very hard. I felt
that I had made a good record In the Senate, and I believe
that I had won the respect of that body. I had been at-
tacked and vilified by the metropolitan press In. the state
of Missouri, and this put me In a fighting mood.
He had been offered a position on the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission by President Roosevelt, but he deollned the offer and
decided to make a fight for vindication and re-election to the
o
Senate.
A meeting was held In St. Louis early In 1940 among Truman's
staunchest supporters to discuss the Senator's chances of win-
ing renomlnatlon. Of the twenty-five to thirty Individuals
1. Trunan, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Year of Decisions
,
I, p. 169.
2. Ibid.
SI
summoned to meet for this occasslon, lees than half of them made
an appearance
. The general feeling of the meet in? was summed
up in the words of Koger Sermon, a long-time friend of Truman
and Mayor of Independence, Missouri.
Harry, I don't think you can win, and that's not
merely my personal opinion but after inquiry around. . .
if you do run, I'll be for you come hell or high water.
Truman himself claimed that his friends at this meeting were
unanimous in advising him not to run* It was felt that the poli-
tical situation was not conducive for a Truman victory due to
the tendergaat issue and the united op oo It ion of the metropoli-
tan newspapers. Truman believed that his New Deal voting record
in the Senate was a principal factor for the overt opposition
of the press.
With all of this evident discouragement , there was one In-
dividual who was hopeful of winning renomlnation for Truman and
that was Victor Measall, Truman's secretary. Messall decided to
call upon Jim iendergast in order to obtain the letter's impres-
sion of Truman's chances of victory. 6 Messall vielted Jim
.-' ndergart, who was now the leader of the shaken Kansas City
organisation, and asked him if he would support him if he sought
renomlnation. hendergaat replied, "You oan tell Harry Truman
that If he gets only two votes in the primary one of them will
3. Helm, Harry Truman
, p. 124.
4. Daniels, Trie Man of Indepenaence
, p. 19b.
5. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Year of Decisions
I, p. Ib9.
6. Helm, Harry Truman , p. 126.
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„7
be mine and the other will be my wife's." With this encourage-
ment from i-endergast, Meeeall called Washington and told Truman
that he was going to file the Senator's notice of Intent b i> run.
Truman consented to this action and on February 3, 1940, Truman
was officially entered In the race for the Democratic senatorial
Q
nomination.
In the campaign Truman had to depend on certain segments of
the voting electorate to provide a prime base of strength. Among
these groups were the Negroes, organised labor, especially the
Railway Unions , and the farmers.
In 1940 Missouri had a total of 244,386 Negroes heavily
oonoentreted In the cities of St. Louis and Kansas City. In
the campaign literature Issued by the Negro Citizens Committee
for the Renomlnatlon and Election of Harry S. Truman for United
States Senator, a partial list of prominent Negroes was cited;
this list of seventeen Individuals Included thirteen residents
of either St. Louis or Kansas City. In a speech given In
Sedalia, Missouri, on June 16, 1940, Truman indicated the ap-
proach he would take regarding minority groups, "I believe In
the brotherhood of mans not merely the brotherhood of white men,
7. Ibid ., p. 126.
8. Tblcf .
9. UanTels, The Man of Independence , p. 199.
10. Ibid ., p. 203.
11. Harry S. Truman, "Negro Citizens Conmlttee for the Re-
nomination and Election of Harry S. Truman", (Campaign literature
located at the Missouri State Historical Soolety, Columbia,
Missouri, 1940).
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12but the brotherhood of all men before the lew."
The Railway Brotherhoods rallied to the support of Truman.
Truman had become familiar with the problems involved in the
railway Industry as a member of the Interstate Commerce Committee,
and labor felt it had a friend in the Missouri Senator. The
Railway Unions, through their newspaper, Labor , blanketed Mis-
souri with between 500,000 and 750,000 copies of a special edi-
tion ten days prior to the primary election. 5 This edition
was headlined "Harry Truman's Magnificent Record Entitles Him
to Another Term" and the entire issue was devoted to the Senator
and his record in the Senate. It was freely sprinkled with
testimonials from colleagues in the Senate* On the front page
three stalwart New Deal Senators, Senator Alben K. Berkley of
Kentucky, majority leader of the Senate, Senator Robert F.
Wagner of New York and Senator James P. Brynes of South Carolina
14
came out in support of Truman. This special edition of Labor
was indeed a needed and welcomed boon to the Truman campaign,
for It provided an opportunity for a last minute statewide ap-
peal to the voters to back Truman without cost to the Truman
campaign finance committee.
Truman in his bid to win the farm vote hit hard at the
concept of "absentee ownership".
I do not wish to see the farmers absorbed by the big
land-holders, to the detriment of the best farming interests.
12. St. Louis frost-Dispatch , June 16, 1940, p. 4c.
15. Daniels, The Man of Independence , p. 204.
14. Labor, July 50, 1940, p. 1.
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The tenant farmer should be encourared, through a liberal
system of credit to buy his own land. With pardonable
pride, I say that ray every effort has been In this
direction. 15
tie believed that the farmer would remember his votlnp record In
support of the New Deal legislation designed to aid the farmer.
Truman was not very confident of obtaining large votes In
the cities. He had the support of Jim ienderrast, but his
organisation, with the downfall of T. J. J'endargast, was still
an unknown quantity. The metropolitan pres; , except for the
Kansas City Journal , was opposed to his renomlnatlon, and they
16
would carry their messa e to every resident of the large cities.
In St. Louis a political organization was emerging to fill
the political power vacuum left by the departure of "Boss"
fendergast • This organization was headed by Mayor Bernard P.
Dlckman of St. Louis, and Robert Hannegan, chairman of the St.
Louis City Democratic organisation. Truman early In the campaign
felt that this organization was wholeheartedly behind the noralna-
17tlon of Stark. This new orranlzatlon was Intent on securing
the gubernatorial nomination for Lawrence McDanlel, former Excise
Commissioner in the City of St. Louis, and Diokmann claimed that
18
he did not want his organization involved In the Senate race.
Therefore as Truman embarked on his campaign for the renoml-
natlon to the United States Senate the prospects were anything
15. Ibid ., p. 3.
16. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman; Year of Decisions ,
I, p. 161.
17. Ibid ., p. 160.
18. St. Louis Post-Dispatch , July 31, 1940, p. 3A.
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but encouraging.
Aocordlng to the Missouri Constitution a Governor oannot
sucoeed himself and because of this fact Lloyd C* Stark either
had to run for the Senate or accept an appointment frorr the
President to stay In public life. The only other alternative
open to the Governor wus to return to the family enterprise.
Stark deolded to enter the Democratic primary race for the
senatorial nomination.
Truman claimed that Stark visited hlra In Washington late In
1939 and told him that he did not Intend to run for the Senate
In 1940; but he then believed that Stark would be Ms prl«i
opponent In the primary. 19 This belief was borne out, when on
January 22, 1940, Stark filed his formal declaration of candidacy
for the Democratic nomination for U. S. Senator, and made the
following statement
:
It Is my Intention to conduct a campaign that will
lead to the sucoess of tne Democratic party in the November
elections.
I am a firm believer In the policies of the national
Democratic administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
I desire to serve Missouri as United States Senator
and pledge myself to fight for the continuance of I resident
Roosevelt's efforts for the general welfare of the people.
I have said, and now reiterate, that I am going to
make the strongest possible campaign for tho nomination,
but I am not plennlnp an attack upon any other Democrat in
order to win the nomination.
19. Truman, .Viemolrs by Harry S. Truman: Year of Leolslons ,
I, p. 160.
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My entire campaign will be based upon my rocord as
Governor of Missouri. I will stand on that .20
In this statement Stark laid down the general outlines of the
type of campaign he hoped to wage.
In his capacity as chief executive of Missouri* Stark had
established a well-organized net of state employees who reported
back to the Governor's offioe information which they felt would
be of benefit to his campaign. A memorandum pertaining to the
method of securing this information was circulated to all de-
partment heads in the State administration, encouraging them to
solicit aid from their employees In this program of campaign
21intelligence.
Stark tied the hands of the state employees solely to his
campaign: "I am taking no side In any races. ... They can be
for any candidates they desire, but they must not get out and
22
take 8 ides aggressively in any other campaign." Thus the
state employees were expected to either sink or swim with the
outcome of the August 6th primary. Those who bolted Stark and
decided to take out on their own, took the risk of being cited
In the "black list" file.
The "black list" was a card file of those who were enjoying
some benefit from his governorship and suspected of disloyalty
to Stark; they were struck from the Governor's favor. In the
20. News release distributed to the press, January 21, 1940.
Located in the Lloyd C. Stark papers (Western Historical Society,
Columbia, Missouri) cited hereafter as Stark papers.
21. Stark papers, June 12, 1940.
22. Kansas City Star, July 4, 1940, p. 4.
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State Supreme Court election battle between D< uglas and Billings
In 1938, the Governor's "black Hot" contained some three hun-
dred and fifty cards on which were written unfavorable comments
the Governor had received concerning state employees. 25
An example of a report on a State employee suspected of
political activities hostile to Stark's Interest was a letter
from a Leon Adams to the Povernor*. At the top of this letter
was a penoiled-in notation "black list,"
Because Mr* J* Sherrod, County Recorder, Is your
appointment *.e thought It advlsacle to write you regarding
the fact that among the first people employed by the
He o order was Mr. She It on Stone, 100 West Armour, who has
for years been a Penderpest worker, worked for them In
last election and -.rimary a a Inst Judge Douglas, was a
clerk In the 20th precinct 5th ward for them last elec-
tion. Why he does not have a position with them, is any
ones guess.
There are so many real citizens here, responsible,
efficient, willing, and needing work. We do not think It
fair for one of that machine should take the place of
people who endured and fought that machine since Its be-
ginning, and not a chance to get any position in the
county or city unless one belonged. We have intended
writing you for some time, thought that no matter was
too small to be overlooked If this beastly machine Is
ever cleaned out of here. I am writing for a group. 24
While this practice of rewards and punishments is not strange to
politics. It demands a loyalty based essentially on fear Instead
of any sincere regard for the individual who demands the loyalty.
This type of forced "loyalty" can feater and work to the dis-
advantage of those who control an organisation based uj on It.
23. Georpe E. Slavena, "Stark as a Polltloal Reformer, 1936-
1941" (unpublished Master's dissertation, Dept. of History, Uni-
versity of Missouri, 1957) p. 92.
24. Leon Adams to Lloyd C. Stark, November 4, 1939, Stark
papers*
II
Stark did not advance his cause among the regular Democratic
party maohln*ry In the state when* In an attempt to prevent the
political use of the W. P. A., In the 1940 primary, he had
Colonel B. Marvin Casteel, '. . .A. administrator for Missouri*
Issue an order restraining his supervisors from holding political
party office. The outcome of this order was the demand that
twenty-six of his supervisors either resign or give up their
posts as county ooanlttee chairmen.
Even with a certain degree of highhandedness on his part In
forming a loyal organization, 3tark possessed an enviable record
of accomplishments as an opponent of political corruption. He
had an unparalleled record of success with his attack on the
corruption of the ballot in Kansas City, and with his drive to
have the legislature create a new election board in that city, he
restored a degree of "sanctity" to the ballot. He also performed
a herculean task In havlnr the Kansas City police department re-
moved from local control. VSlth this record of political reform
Stark would be a formidable candidate In any political race he
entered.
The third man In this three cornered race for the Democratic
senatorial nomination was Maurice M. Mllllgan. He presented a
peculiar case. Before the meeting held In St. Louis to plumb
the prospects of Truman winning renomlnatlon, Mllllpan contacted
Roger Sermon and aiked for his sup. ort. Sermon stated thai; he
would be for Truman If he ran, but In the eventuality that he
25. St. Louis Post-Dispatch , January 12, 1940, p. 54*
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stayed out of the race, he would support Milligan. 26 Milligan
came Into the race, according to his account, when he believed
that Truman would not seek ro-election. It was Milligan'
a
understanding that Truman would be offered an appointment by the
President and therefore was encouraged to enter the campaign
against .Stark. 27
It was also believed that the shaken I'endergast organization
would favor Mllllean, the prosecutor, over Stark, the "ingrete",
if a contest developed between these two men. 88 A letter sent
to Stark dated October 23, 1939, by a William C. McReynolds tells
of a discussion MoKeynolds had with a Kansas City Star reporter*
I was talking with a Star reporter Saturday afternoon,
and this reporter tells me that the hlrher-ups in the
Pendergast organization are trying to induce Truman not to
run for re-election and are endeavoring to get Maurice
Milligan to run. 29
While Indeed this is a paradoxical situation, Covernor
Stark .nrorraed his campaign ohief In St. Louis, Judge Jesse
McLonald, that it was his Intent to tie Milligan to the i-endergast
organization.
In other words, from now on out, I probably will spend
a considerable portion of each speech reminding the people
that Senator Truman Is the Pendergaat candidate, followed
with a good strong attack on the Pendergast machine and only
a brief reminder that the other candidate, Maurice M.
Milligan, (whose name I probably will not use) is also
backed with elements of the Pendergast machine. 50
26. Daniels, The Man of Independence
, p. 199.
27. Milligan, Missouri Waltz
, pp. ~23T-2^2.
28. Daniels, The Man of Independence
, p. 199.
29. William C. :<eneynolds to Lloyd C Stark, October 25,
1939, Stark papers.
30. Jesse ^oLonald to Lloyd C. Stark, July 22, 1939, Stark
papers.
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The determination of Milllran to enter the raoe and the charges
thet he had elements of the i-endergast organization backing his
oandidaoy did not prevent him from Keying his campaign to the
issue of Penderrastism:
Penderrastism is an issue in this campaign because the
Pendergast machine of Kansas City is attempting to stage a
comeback through the oandidaoy of Senator Truman and reraln
the
tr.o
power It lost when it was cracked by the long arm of
Federal government.
His campaign literature bristled with his successful attack on
the Pendergast machine* It outlined in chronological order his
work in the vote fraud cases and his ultimate victory in securing
the Imprisonment of T. J* Pendergast. Milllgan denied any alle-
gation that he was aligned with the Pendergast organisation and
disclaimed any connection with "Court House Rings":
Already in this early stage of the campaign Governor
Stark has issued a statement charging that Pendergast and
his Kansas City machine, its new allies, and the Court
House rings are opposing him in his race. I do not know
who he means by "new allies" and "Court House Kings" for
the Governor refused to say; but so that the record may
be kept straight I want to emphasize to the people of
Missouri what they already know* that I am not a new ally
of Penderpast or his Kansas City machine nor am I an old
ally of Pendergast or his machine. Never during my life
have I ever trod the political pathway to 1908 Main Street
with my hat in hand; n r have I ever asked or received
any favor or support from Pendergast or his machine.
Neither of my opponents can make this frank statement for
everyone knows they both have been allies of Pendergast
and his machine. Senator Truman is Indebted to Pendergast
for every political office he has ever held. In 1952
Governor Stark on two occasions unsuccessfully sought the
support of Pendergast for Governor and again in 1936 he
sought and obtained the endorsement and support of Pendergast
and his machine which Insured his nomination and election
as Governor. They were In the name boat. Truman refused
31. Kansas City Star, July 7, 1940, p. 24.
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to desert the ship even when It was sinking but the
Governor went over-board when the first torpedo struck
As the campaign moved Into the last two months before the
August 6th primary date, the strategy that each candidate would
employ In his bid for the nomination wan becoming more evident*
Truman planned to concentrate all of his efforts in presenting
his Senate record to the people and did not expect to Indulge
in personalities. 3* It was evident that Truman's past connec-
tion did not favor his use of personal attacks on his opponents*
Truman believed that If he Ignored Stark during the campaign
this would inoense the Governor and lead him into making rash
34
statements which would aid the Truman campaign. In order to
get his Senate record to the people , Truman was helped generously
by his colleagues In the Senate who gave freely of their time to
bolster the campaign of the Junior Senator of Missouri.
Illlllgan on the othv r hand was oontont to ride to victory on
s program of antl-irendergast ism. A speech at Poplar Bluff, Mis-
souri, In which Mllliran charged that T. J. lendergast was back
in the game of politics and In fact was the force engineering
Truman's campaign, brought a speedy reaction from the Judge who
sentenced lendergast to prison. Federal Judge Merril E. Otis
32. Maurice :;. Milligan, "Democrats Will Win Again With
Milligan" (campaign literature located at the Missouri State
Historical Society, Columbia, Missouri, 1940).
S3. Harry S. Truman, "Letter to Supporters" (campaign
literature located at the Missouri State Historical Society,
Columbia, Missouri, 1940).
34. Daniels, The Man of Independence , p. 205.
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immediately wrote to the probation officer, Mr. Grout
i
I am sure you must have read in this morning edition
of the Kansas City Times the Associated Ires.* dispatch from
Poplar Bluff, Mo., dated July 9, In which it is Intimated
that T. J* Fenderrast has violated the terms of his parole*
You are directed to invest igute this intimation at once
and to report to me in writing, within ten days, whether the
intimation has or has not any base of fact*
If your investigation requires it, and you advise me,
the grand jury will be directed to give you every possible
assistance. 35
On July 17th !n a reply to the letter of Judge Otis, Orout in-
formed the Judge that the allegation of Millisan did not have
basis of fact:
Reference is made to your letter of July 10, 1940,
calling the attention of this office to an article which
appeared in the press to the effect that Thomas J* icnder-
gast has violated the terms of probation in that he has
participated, directly or Indirectly in political activities
since his period of probation began, and particularly that
he has, through his nephew, Jimmy Pendergast, directed the
political campaign of Harry Truman, candid- te for the
Democratic nomination for U* s* Senator*
This is to advise that I have made careful inquiry and
investigation of all information brought to the attention
of this office, and have also investigated rumors and lnti-
mation and have made inquiry of persons who might be in a
position to have knowledge of any such political activities,
and I have been unable to discover any evidence competent
in any court to approve that Mr* Pendergest has either
directly or indirectly taken part In any political
activities*
In the future this office will continue to make investi-
gations of any reports or Information received, to be oertain
that all conditions of
;
robat ion imposed in this case shall
be complied with strictly and faithfully.36
These two letters clearly indicate the tone which the Mllllgan
55* Kansas City Star , July 10, 1940, p. 1*
36. Kansas City Star , July 16, 1940, p. 1.
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campaign would follow; he had made a successful career out of
prosecuting the Pendergast forces and now he desired to be nom-
inated on an anti-Fendergast platform.
Governor Stark in setting up his strategy was involved in
a dilemma of sorts; on the issue of Pendergast isn he had to share
the "glory" of the machine's downfall with Maurice M. Milllgan,
and on his avowed support of the New Deal he had to compete with
the positive record of Truman's support of the Administration's
program in the Senatw. These two factors would alter the promise
he made when he filed for the nomination. At that time, he
stated he was not planning an attack upon any other Democrat in
order to win the nomination.
The Stark forces were determined to tie Truman to Pendergast
and to attack the Kansas City Democratic machine. On the issue
of establishing himself as the advocate of clean government.
Stark received a setback when Senator Guy Gillette, chairman of
the Senate Committee on Campaign Expenditures, released a state-
ment to the press Indicating that state employees were forced to
give contributions to Stark's campaign:
This campaign of solicitation and direct or Indirect
co-erclon is being systematically carried on by a repre-
sentative designated by the Governor through hearts of the
various state departments. Records of such representatives
reveal that on May 31 approximately #28,000 had been
pledged, of which ill, 000 had been collected. 37
Stark replied to this charge that the report of the Committee was
an attempt to "smear" him; he went on to deny that any "Lug" had
37. St. Louis Post-Dlspatoh , June 21, 1940, p. 1.
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been placed upon anyone by him or his campaign committee. He
aald that at all times his Instruction had been without pressure.
The month of July was a difficult time for the Governor to
campaign actively for the senatorial nomination. Three factors
curtailed Stark's campaign activities. He was seriously consider-
ed a Vice-Presidential candidate; secondly, the Democratic Na-
tional Convention was held in Chicago the week of the 15th;
thirdly, the Governor had called a special session of the Mis-
souri legislature to appropriate extra money for direct relief.
Stark had been considered a possibility for the Vice-Presi-
dential nomination at a conference on July 23, 1939, held at
Hyde Park, New York, between James Parley and President
39
Roosevelt. In fact, William Allen 'Thite believed that Stark
was the ideal person for the nomination:
Stark Is without flaw, spot or blemish. He Is a
graduate of Annapolis. He is a World War soldier. He is
an experienced executive as head of one of America's
largest nurseries. He, as Governor, has been a reform
Governor who led the fight on the Pendergast machine in
K. C. He has all the good points of a first class candi-
date. His opponents can only point to a report of the
discredited Gillette Senate Investigation Committee,
which alleges that Stark's friends collected lug for his
state campaign from state officials. This charge Stark
vigorously and plausibly denies, and the charge has not
seriously harmed him. Stark's track strategy is that of
a dark horse and his backers are willing to let Eouglas
get right out in front, occupying the place In this con-
vention that Dewey held in the Republican convention.40
38. St. Louis Post -Dispatch , June 23, 1940, p. 3C
39. James A. Farley, dim Farley's Story (New York:
Whittlesey House, 1948), p. 185.
40. Kansas City Star, July 14, 1940, p. 4A.
45
With the Democrat Ic national convention to be opened In the
middle of July, stark had little to be pleased with In the Mis-
souri delegation. When the delegates held an organisation meet-
ing at the end of June, they repudiated the Governor by not
naming him to an iiort. nt c amittee, or even pivin? to him the
entirely honorary position of vice-chairman. The Governor, who
was s delegate at larpe was not present at this organisational
caucus. To make matters worse, Harry S. Truman was selected by
the delegat. to be Missouri's delegate to the all important
platform committee at the national convention, and Senator
41Bennett Clark was named chairman of the State delegation.
Earlier In the year at the State Democratic convention
which met on Apr'l 15th in ot . Louis to select the delegates to
the national convent ion, an attempt was proposed to prevent
Stark from being named a delegate. Truman stopped this maneu-
ver because he did not want to make a political martyr of
42
Stark. B
The third factor which out Into the Governor's valuable
time to campaign for the senatorial nomination was the special
session of the Missouri legislature. The Governor called the
special session "for the purpose of meeting the impending emer-
gency whereunrler. In the absence of prompt action, the state
would be compelled to discontinue. . . that important phase of
41. St. Louis Post-Dispatch , June 29, p. 5c.
42. Daniels, The Man of Independence, p. 206.
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our public assistance propram designated as 'direct relief «". 43
An addltloral burden wh r ch Stark had to contend with was his
running feud with Senator Bennett Clerk, senior Senator from
Missouri* A strained relationship existed between these two
men, and accc: to the St. Louis i oet-Dlspatoh , this rela-
tionship had never satisfactorily been explained. Clark Indi-
cated he was moved to rebel against Stark when the latter branched
out and began to take in too much territory.
I was under the Impression that the constitution
limited the Governor's jurisdiction to the State of Mis-
souri. When he began to try and run the country I decided
it might be well to put hJm in hie place.44
The St. Louis i oat -D Ik pat oh offered as an explanation that
a measure of Jealousy developed between Stark and Senator Clark
when two years previously Clark was mentioned as a prospective
Democratic Presidential candidate by several eastern magazines
and Stark failed to become active in support of Clark's Presl-
45dentlal aspirations. Rerardleas of the nature of the feud, it
was apparent that Clark was going to wage a campaign of invective
and ridicule against istark when he made the accusation that the
Governor was a candidate "for President, Vice-President, United
States Senator, King of Swat and for a few other things/'
As the campaign progressed into July it appeared that Truman
was being Isolated by his two opponents except for their continued
45. Missouri, Journal of Mlegourl Legislature , 60th General
Assembly (Extra Session, 1940 J p. 5.
44. St. Louie Poet-Dispatch, July 1*3, 1940, p. 1.
45. Ibid .
46. TbTd".
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charge of Pendergastlsm. Stark and Milli-an seeded contented to
challenge each others contention that he alone wag solely respon-
sible for the downfall of Pendergast. Mllllgan clai-ed that the
Governor did not become a crusader until the Pendergast machine
was groggy from the continual hammering of the 7?«deral Govern-
ment, and only then did Stark begin to wave the banner of reform.47
Stark challenged Mllllgan to deny that he was being supported by
Joseph B. Shannon, Pendercast » s former associate.*9
Stark also showed slrns of campaigning against Senator
Clark instead of Truman. In reply to a charge by Clark that the
8 vernor'e Presidential or Vice-Presidential campaign appeared to
be in full swing everywhere except in Missouri* Stark called
Senator Clark disloyal:
Senator Clark is obsessed with the idea that he
represents the Democracy of Missouri. He does not. He
misrepresents that racy. The Democrats of Missouri
do not support him in his continuous sniping disloyalty
to President Kooaevelt and the national administration.4 ®
This only enoouraged more histrionics from Clark, who
claimed that Stark was probably the first man In history who ever
attempted to run for President or Vice-President by employing
SO
methods usually adopted to races for constable.
These exchanges between Senator Clark, and Stark and those
between the Governor and willij-an were surely helpful to Truman
who continued his plan r polnp to the people with his Senate
47. St. Louis Poat-blapatoh , July 9, 1940, p. So.
48. Kansas City Star , «jaly~21, 1940, p. 6c
49. St. Louis ^osT=D'lspatch , July 11, 1940, p. 18A.
50. Ibid.
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record.
The Democratic national convention of 1940 was clearly a
political debacle as far as Governor Stark was concerned. Stark
continually denied that he was a candidate for any other office
except United States Senator: "I am not goirg to be a candidate
for any place on the national ticket, and I hope my friends will
not present my name to the convent Ion.''81 Just four days after
he made this statement. Stark opened headquarters In Chlcac o In
order to seek the Vice-iresldential nomination. Robert Oeorge
of Lebo, Kansas, was designated ss Stark's floor manager at the
convention. 62 Shortly after the opening of his headquarters.
Stark stated, ''1 am going to let nature take its course* I am
not a candidate, but I am not going to hold the boys back any
longer."63
With this announcement, Stark was openly In the struf^le for
the Vioe-Presldentlal nomination. His forces in Chicago were very
optimistic, hobert George, his floor leader, claimed;
The Governor will have about £00 votes on the first
ballot, chiefly because we are not asking anyone to ignore
an obligation to a favorite sen. On the second ballot we
can count on at least 400 votes, and we'll nominate on the
third. 54
This enthusiastic estimate of Hobert Oeorge did not coincide
with the opinion of Senator Clark, who said, "I don't think he
(Stark) has four and one-half votes in the Missouri delegation
51. Kansas City Star , July 11, 1940, p. 1.
5L. Kansas City Sta£, July 15, 19*0, p. 1.
53. Kansas City ;>tar , ouly 1(5, 1940, p. 1.
54. Ibid.
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inoluding his own."
The Vice-Presidential aspirations of Governor Stark were
extinguished when Henry Viallace's nam* was placed In nomination.
When It became clear that Wallace was favored by Roosevelt, Stark
Issued the following statement
:
It has been my contention and the contention of my
supporters that a Midwesterner should be nominated for Vice-
President*
My friends had planned to place my name in nomination,
but we are all anxious to make the nomination for Vice-
President harmonious, and I think that my friend Secretary
Wallace has great strength and the support of the farmers.
He will make an ideal candidate for the Vice-President
and I am hap;,y to withdraw in his favor. 86
The attempt to obtain the Vice-Presidential nomination was
Indeed a calculated gamble by the Governor. The outcome of the
gamble aided both Stark's opponents, because in his quest for
national office he had become idle in the State race and showed
questionable sincerity in seeking the Senate seat of Harry S.
Truman. Stark was placed in the politically unfortunate position
of reaching for two political plums at the same time.
After Stark issued his statement in support of Henry Wallace
for Vice-President, Clark continued his attack on the Governor.
In the voting of the Vice -Presidential nomination Stark sup-
ported Wallace, but Clark, who controlled the State delegation,
persuaded the delegates to back Senator William B. iiankheed. As
a result Governor Stark was again handed a set back when the
55. Ibid .
56. Kansas City Star, July 18, 1940, p. 1.
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Missouri delegation voted 28| for Bankliead and 1* votes for
Wallace. 57
When otark returned home from the convention in order to
prepare for the special session of the State Legislature , it be-
came difficult to ascertain his strength. He largely was without
support from party backers in the oounties; he appealod to voters
who tock virtually no part In the mechanics of politics, but who
still oast their ballot.88
Since its Inception, Stark's campaign had been hindered by
the rumors that Stark would accept a position in the i resident's
cabinet. In a telegram that a Stark supporter, Frank [»• Lubolae
sent to the Covemor, this condition was mentioned:
Your friends know you would accept any commission that
you deemed your patriotic duty. If national service should
necessitate yotUP withdrawal from the Senatorial race, please
persuade your most capable proponent to file for said offioe
tomorrow, the last day for filing, because we believe you
wish to see your principles live on In our state. w
Stark immediately sent a reply to Dubolse's telegram and stated:
Appreciate your telegram. Absolutely no truth to any
rumors that I have been offered Secretary of the Navy or
any other post. I deeply appreciate your confidence but I
am in the Senate raoe to stay and I am confident I will be
elected. 60
The rumors persisted and on July 27, 1940, Stark charged
that Clark inspired this false gossip and insisted that he would
67. St. Louis l-oat-Dlspatch , July 19, 1940, p. 6A.
58. St. Louis t oat -Despatch , July 28, 1940, p. 3B.
59. Telegram of Prank L. Duboise to Lloyd 0. Stark, June 7,
1940, Stark papers*
60. Telegram of Lloyd C. Stark to Prank L. Duboise, June 7,
1940, Stark papers.
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not even consider an appointment to the President's Cabinet. 61
Stark had a friendly relationship with the Administration,
and Truman believed that Stark was supported by Roosevelt for
the nomination. 62 Stark visited the white House often and it
appeared Roosevelt was pleased by his attempt to wrest the nomina-
tion from Truman.
This belief that the Roosevelt Administration was covertly
supporting Stark seems valid when we note a citation in the
Seoret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, Roosevelt's Secretary of the
Interior;
Senator Truman telephoned me yesterday to ask whether
.fould pass the word down the line to any Missouri people
in Interior to vote f'or hla for Senator. I told him that
one had to be very careful because we were not supposed to
take sides when there was a contest, and there distinctly
ia a contest In Missouri. My information is that Governor
Stark is In the lead and personally I :^avor Governor Stark,
although Truman has made a good Hew Deal Senator. 63
When we couple this reference with the telegram that the White
House sent to U.K. Wodlow, Chairman of Truman's Labor Reception
Committee, in response to a request by that individual that
Roosevelt endorse Truma:: we notice a decided coolness towards
Truman:
The President asks me to explain to you personally that
while Senator Truman is sn old and trusted friend of the
President his invariable practice has been not to take part
in primary contests. This is because in contests of this
61. St. Louis Post-Dispatch , July 27, 1940, p. IA.
62. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Year o r Decisions , I
p. 159.
63. Harold L. Ickes, The Seoret Diary of Harold L. Ickes: The
Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941 (New York: Slnon and Schuster. 1953)
III, pp. 2C5-206.
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character among members of his own party the President must
stand aloof regardless of any personal preference he might
have. 64
This is a decided turn about since Roosevelt did actively partic-
ipate in the Democratic primaries of 1938. It was true that in
1938 Roosevelt did "burn his hands" with his attempted "purge",
but there was an Inherent difference between the 1938 situation
and Mr. Wodlow's request for Presidential support. In 1938
Roosevelt was attacking Democratic Congressmen who were frus-
trating the work of the New Deal, while Truman was a staunch
advocate of the New Deal and was deserving of some recognition
for his efforts in behalf of the Administration.
With the campaign moving into the last week prior to the
election, Stark counted Mllligan out of the race. He expressed
the opinion that everything pointed to the fact that he had only
one opponent to beat and that was Senator Harry S. Truman.
If this opinion was correct, Mllligan would still be a thorn
in the side of the Governor, because both men were appealing to
essentially the same voters, tho:;e who were opposed to Pender-
gast ism.
As the election was just around the corner the campaign
centered in intensity In St. Louis, where the candidates were
fighting for support of the regular organization committeemen.
64. Elliot Roosevelt, F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1928-1945
(New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce Inc., 1950 ; II,p.l049.
65. Lloyd C. Stark to R. Perry Spencer, July 29, 1940,
Stark papers*
66. St. Louis Post-Dispatch , August 2, 1940, p. 4C
.
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The St. LouIb Democrat ic committeemen were a tightly knit
and disciplined organisation. Perhaps the najor reason for this
fact con be found In the philosophy of ~eorge B. Tracy, chairman
of the St. Louis Efficiency Board, and an appointas of Mayor
Bernard P. Dicknann:
City erployee8 who double-crossed the organization
would be discharged. If anyone pretends to be a member
of our organisation it's his duty to support the orra nida-
tion. If he can't support us* he should resign from the
city service. Then he can support anyone he wants and
we'll r. main friends. „ No one is compelled to be a meaner
of our organization.
This classic statement in FOgarfl to personnel relationships
came from a nan who was chief of the Mayor's Civil Service Com-
mittee set up to establish a true merit system. It also gave an
Indication of the nature of the St. Louis organization, deter-
mined to elect a Governor.
The Mayor maintained that the race for the Democratic sena-
torial nomination was wide-open in St. Louis. He sent telegrams
to the chairmen of the McDaniel for Governor commit t>3es in ten
out-stffte congressional districts, notifying them that the City
organization which was booking McDaniel, was not throwing Its
organized support to any of the three candidates for the Demo-
cratic nomination for the United States Senator.*8
Stark seemed confident that the St. Louis organization would
not move away from the position of neutrality in the senatorial
race.
67. St. Louis lost -Li spat oh , July 7, 1940, p. 5A.
. Bt. Louis i ost-Llspatch, July 51, 1940, p. 3A.
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A letter sent to Stark by a C . L. Shot we 11 mentioned e
"deal" between the Truman and MoDanlel forces:
I am reliably Informed that the friends of Senator
Truman In Western Missouri are trying to make a deal with
the St. Louis City Administration whereby the friends of
Truman will support MoDanlel In return for the adminis-
tration^ support of Senator Truman. Unless the city
administration agrees to this, the friends of Senator
Truman threaten to support Mctteynolds for the gubernatorial
nomination .69
In his reply to Shotwell Just before the election, the
Governor indicated no alarm concerning a proposed "deal": "I am
of the opinion that there has not been and will not be a deal
made between those forces you mention. I feel very confident
70
of carrying both Kansas City and St. Louis."
On August 1, 1940, Robert E. Hannegen, chairman of the
Democratic City Committee, Informed the St. Louis rost-Dlspatoh
that an Informal poll of committee members, indicated that about
10 of the cities 28 wards would support Governor Lloyd C. Stark
for United States Senator, 10 were pledged to Senator Harry S.
Truman and two would back Kaurice tfililgan. The remaining six
71
wards were still undetermined. *
A Mr. Conran, chairman of Truma^s Speaker Committee, des-
cribed his participation in a maneuver such as the one described
Shotwell 1 s letter to Governor Stark
t
69. C. L. Shotwell to Lloyd C. Stark, July 11, 1940, Stark
papers.
70. Lloyd C Stark to C. L. Shotwell, July 29, 1940, Stark
papers.
71. St. Louis Post-Dlspatoh , August 1, 1940, p. 4A.
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I finally contacted Jamas Waechter, who had been help-
ing us get our position over to Hannegan, within a few days
of election day, and told him we couldn't wait any longer.
If Hannegan was going with Stark we were ready to start our
campaign against McDanlel. Hannegan telephoned me later
that day and said he was going for Truman and would slate
him in his ward. He followed this with an announcement in
the papers a day or so before the election. We were later
informed that he and Dickmann had a conference and decided
something had to be done. They argued that Hannegan would
make his move for Truman and Dickmann would stay with Stark-
which is exactly what they did.72
Politically the decision made at the conference was a wise move,
for in a close election, and surely this was such an election,
when the outcome was doubtful, the St. Louis organization could
do nothing but gain by splitting its support between the two
top candidates.
This was the decisive move, at least in Truman's view: "The
biggest break was when Bob Hannegan, who had been working for
Stark, sensed that he was backing the wrong man and switched his
support to me."
Mllllgan continued his campaign of Invective against Stark
up to the dosing days of the campaign. He called Stark a
"swashbuckling war-monger and a pompous military inclined oandi-
74date." Stark, on the other hand, concentrated his attack on
Truman, whom he called a "Fendergast stooge", and called for the
people to vote for him in order to make certain that the war on
75
Fendergast ism would be successful.
72. Daniels, The Man of Independence
, p. 209.
73. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Year of Decisions
,
I, p. 16.
74. St. Louis Post-Dispatch , August 3, 1940, p. 3A.
76. Ibid.
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Three days before the election the situation was still not
clear In the St. Louis area. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported
that a swing from Truman to Stark was taking place headed by the
Dlokmann forces In an effort to help Lawrence McDanlel win the
gubernatorial nomination. It was claimed that the Governor was
being slated In many wards In order to take the onus of machine
76
off McDanlel.
As the campaign ended all of the candidates except Truman
declared their confidence In winning the election. Stark claimed
that he would win the nomination by a plurality of 150,000 votes,
whereas Mllligan was more conservative and expected a plurality
of only 94,000 votes. The Truman forces said that "hot air"
77
numerical estimates would be omitted.
On August 6, 1940, the Democrats of Missouri went to the
polls to nominate one of three men to represent the party as
the Democratic senatorial nominee at the general election. After
the polls closed and the votes were tabulated, Harry S. Truman
won renomlnation by a scant 7,976 votes over his nearest rival
Lloyd G. Stark who polled a total of 260,581 votes. Maurice M.
Mllllgan, the other candidate in the race for the Senatorial
nomination, obtained 127,363 votes. Truman emerged the victor
in this exceedingly close election by receiving a total vote of
268,557 votes.78
76. St. Louis Post-Dispatch , August 4, 1940, p. 3A.
77. Ibid.
78. Missouri, Official Manual State of Missouri, 1941-1942 ,
p. 367.
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Stark claimed after the election that he loet the raoe be-
cause the two machines In the lar^e urban areas supported Truman
while he obtained t^ore support from the outstate counties than
79both of his opponents combined.
This statement at face value is oorrect but as Figure 1 In
the appendix indicates Truman held his own in the outstate regions
and carried both of the large urban areas, Kansas City and St.
Louis City*
Figure 2 shows that Milligan ran far behind Truman in the
majority of the State's 114 counties, but that his strength was
enough to deter any major outstate sweep by the Stark forces.
Truman won the race by a bare margin of 7,976 votes over
his closest rival Governor Stark. The crux of Truman's success
can be better understood when we quote from a letter Stark sent
to R. Harrison Field on November 21, 1939, before the campaign
ever began: "I am not a professional politician as you know. My
training and background has been in the field of business and
BO
agriculture rather than polities*"
79. Lloyd C. Stark to Stuart S. Ooode, August 20, 1940,
Stark papers.
80. Lloyd C. Stark to R. Harrison Field, November 21, 1939,
Stark papers.
58
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
When Harry S. Truman entered the campaign he possessed
certain decided disadvantages. He was a Fendergast man and
Pendergast had been sent to prison. He also had attempted to
prevent the reappointment and confirmation of Maurice M. Mil-
llgan for a second term as United States District Attorney*
This action reemphaslzed the fact that he had close ties with
the Kansas City organization. Furthermore, the large metropoli-
tan newspapers were undertaking a massive attack on urban machine
politics.
Lloyd C. Stark, on the other hand, was the proud possessor
of an outstanding gubernatorial reoord. He had destroyed elec-
tion crookedness in Kansas City; he had appointed an honest
Election Board in that city and above all he had removed the
control of the Kansas City Police Department from the hands of
the local machine.
Maurice M. Milllgan, the former United States District
Attorney, did not own a record of achievement such as the one
compiled by Stark but he did actively participate, and very suc-
cessfully, in the downfall of Pendergast 's Kansas City organisa-
tion and especially in the eventual confinement of Thomas J.
Pendergast.
The records and previous accomplishments of the three candi-
dates involved in the contest for the Democratic senatorial
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nomination wore not the sole considerations whioh ultimately
decided the outcome of this primary election. Truman was a
shrewd politician who understood the forces at work in the cam-
paign, i enderrastlsm was an issue, this Truman could not deny.
It woulc: have been ridiculous for him to disassociate himself
from the Kansas City machine. Truman was being accused of guilt
by association and he decided not to exert energy In his own
defense* Instead he obtained the support of the remnants of the
Fendergaat organization and be an a concerted effort to win over
the emerging machine of St. Louis.
In his approach to politic? Truman acted as a realist. He
outwardly aimed hla campaign at the farmer, laborer, and minority
groups, a standard procedure In State-wide political campaigns.
Inwardly, he attempted to exert pre- sure on recalcitrant organi-
sational chiefs. Truman had established a reputation for un-
swerving loyalty to his friends even when they wore In serious
trouble. Truman subscribed to the same philosophy as Pendergast,
namely, that It was the delivery of the votes that counted in
political contest.
Stark, on the other hand displayed a lack of political common
sense which at times bordered on the ludicrous. His political
organization consisted largely of State office holders whom he
had tied securely to his own race. If their support was not to
wane, he had to wage a vigorous campaign. The state employees
were cognizant of the fact that their own future was allied to
the Governor's success. It Is conceivable that when the Governor's
10
desire for national office overcome the bounds of sound political
Judgment, they be, an to look elsewhere for a political saviour.
Stark 1 ; behavior during the campaign In regard to his dis-
astrous quest for the Vice-i residential nomination crested a
situation where the Governor's sincerity In seeking the Senate
seat of Harry S. Truman could be questioned. The voters were
presented with a candidate who behaved in a very erratic manner.
First he denied any desire for national office, then he openly
sought the Vice-President ial nomination, and finally he was em-
barrassed by his own State delegation when that group repudiated
the Governor's endorsement of Henry Wallace and threw its sup-
port behind Senator William Bankhead.
The Governor lacked political finesse in his treatment of
his own State party. The action of the Governor demanding the
removal of the W.P.A. from polltlos resulted In a disenchantment
with the Governor by party regulars. His highhanded treatment
of members of his own organization and his continual attack on
Pendergastlsm created the ima e of an individual who would stop
at nothing In order to satisfy his own political ambition.
Stark's ambition ran head-on Into the thwarted ambition of
Senator Bennett Clark. Clark was an anti-New Deal Senator in a
sea of New Deal spirit; he had visions of himself as a likely
candidate for the Presidential nomination in 1940 if Franklin
Delano Kcoeevelt could be stopped in his bid to overturn the
three term tradition. Clerk was not pleased to see the Governor
advance his career nationally, as it diminished his own chancea
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to become an Important national fipure. The Senator commenced
an attack of ridicule and invective against Stark in order to
curtail the political ambitions of the Governor. Stark choose
to answer these attacks and in doing so wasted considerable time
which could have been utilized to better advantage If he would
have concentrated his energy on unseating Truman.
The Governor's campaign of political reform beoame tainted
when a Senate report on campaign expenditures indicated that the
Stark forces wore obtaining forced financial contributions from
State employees* Since economics plays an important role in any
political contest* the Stark campaign forces decided to use this
method of contributions. Yet, they were having "a terrible time
getting along with their finances
•
Special interest groups utilized their financial resources
in the campaign in such a manner as to Influence the shaping of
public policy. Pressure was exerted in order to maintain the
status quo in public policy or attempts were made to move off
center in either direction. The Railway Union's support of
Truman's campaign was an example of this conditions. The Railway
Unions Issued the Invaluable speoial edition of Labor ten days be-
fore the end of the campaign. Organized labor realized that
Truman had supported the New Deal legislation which had strength-
ened labor unions and by use of its economic power was attempting
1. Jack Stapleton to Henry 0. Salveter, July 29, 1940,
Stark papers.
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to assuro the election of one who sup: ort <=U their Interests.
After Stark decided to move away from hie stated strategy
of not attacking members of his own party and be an to ware a
campaign based en charges of corruption and iendergastism, he
moved directly Into oonfllot with Mlligan. Illligan's entire
oaapalgn was centered on the Issue of Pendergastisni.
Milligan' s entrance Into the race was of real significance
because when Truman filed for renominatlon he had two opponents
who had to 3hare the antl-Pendergast votes. This situation was
clearly favorable to the Senator and It Is not beyond belief
that Milligan was induced Into the campaign for this specific
reason. Whether Milligan was duped into entering the race or
not is hard to determine. Milligan'a own book, The 'lssourl
Waltz , is definitely bitter toward Truman and the Fendergast
organization, but the fact remains that when Milligan sought
renominatlon and confirmation for United States District At-
torney for the third time in 1940, Truman did not stand in his
p
way. When we contrast Truman's behavior with his bitter de-
nunciation of Milligan in fcha 1958 debate over renominatlon and
conflrmation we notice a decided shift in Truman's attitude
towards Milligan. The United States District Attorney also Is-
sued a statement In 1944 Indicating that in the investigations
undertaken by Milllgan's office into the corruption in Kansas City
"never once did the finger of suspicion point In the direction of
2. Daniels, The Man of Independence , p. 212.
II
Senator Truman." TMf ststament by a political opponent who
tried every conceivable maneuver in his own campaign for the
Senate nomination to tie Truman to Pendergast is difficult to
comprehend, indeed.
Mllllgan's entrance into the race and Harmo/an':- eleventh
hour shift to Truman were the two key factors which led to
Truman's victory. Millljran carried only five counties out of •
total one hundred and fourteen counties, but he compiled a total
vote of 127,363* This was accomplished by a candidate who made
Pendergastlsm his sole issue in the campaign, and when we note
that Stark lost the election by a total of only 7,976 votes w»
readily notice the significance of Mllllran's entrance Into the
race. If 3,089 voters switched their votes from Truman to Stark
the Governor would have wen the Senatorial nomination.
The St. Louis City Domocrutlo Committee Chairman's shift
was of real Importance because Truman carried the City by a vote
margin of 8,411 over Stark and this figure almost coincides with
the vote margin by which Truman won the election. Hsnnegan's
move toward Truman paid off handsomely because thereafter the
St* Louis politician's own star began to rise. He successively
obtained the following positions: TJnlted States Collector of
Internal Revenue for the Eastern District of Missouri, Commissioner
of Internal Revenue In Washington, D»C, Democratic National Chair-
man, and Postmaster Oeneral In Harry S» Truman's cabinet*
3. Mllilgan, Missouri Waltz, p. 217.
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When we couple the two key factors, Milligan's entrance
into the race and Hannegan's shift to Truman, with the series
of political blunders which Stark committed in his attempt to
satisfy his own political ambitions, we become aware of a degree
of political astuteness on the part of Truman which was not to
be found in the makeup of his major adversary.
Truman was primarily a political realist and he wa3 cognizant
of the fact that Issues and personal attacks alone do not deter-
mine the outcome of elections* The most important thing is to
deliver the vote. It was to this end that Truman concentrated
his major efforts. It was this thorough understanding of the
realities of politics that enabled Harry S. Truman to win the
most Important struggle for power in his home state of Missouri*
An attempt to assess the prowess of a political actor in a
given set of circumstances poses obvious difficulties of measure-
ment. The degree to which Harry S. Truman possessed political
astuteness can be evaluated in comparison with his major adver-
sary and with analysis of the circumstances surrounding the con-
flict. While it cannot be assumed that victory at the polls
measures the calibre of the actors, it is helpful to relate the
outoome to the choices and decisions that were made. The study
suggests that the examination of Harry Truman's perception of
other political situations, such as those existing in 1944, 1948,
and 1952, would be rewarding and contribute to understanding of
politioal behavior.
The present inquiry cannot be closed without reference to
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certain difficulties In obtaining research material. The original
hope that the Truman Library would yield sufficient documentation
proved groundless. This disappointment found partial compensa-
tion, however, in the permission to examine the private papers
of former Governor Lloyd C. Stark. These papers were housed by
the Western Historical Society at Columbia, Missouri. They
proved to be invaluable, notwithstanding the limitation placed
upon their use that only the private papers pertaining directly
to the 1940 primary be examined.
The material available was applied with diligence to the
general concept of political astuteness of political actors and
in the framework of the situations and circumstances of 1940
Harry S. Truman did not come off second best.
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My interest In Harry S. Truman's senatorial primary election
of 1940 as a thesis topic developed out of a meeting held between
Truman and the members of Kansas State University's Political
Science Club. This meeting awakened an Interest to Investigate
the early political life of the individual who was reputed to be
the "man from Pendergast" and a desire to obtain a better under-
standing of the political nature of the man who rose to the office
of the Presidency even though he was closely allied with one of
the most discredited political organizations in the United States.
This study is principally an Inquiry into the political
nature of Harry S. Truman. The selection of a party primary
election afforded an opportunity to observe the practical politi-
cian in his own element, the political arena. The paper Is con-
cerned with situations and circumstances which actually occurred
in the primary elections and how the political combatants reacted
to these realities. The intention is not to analyze the voting
behavior of the Missouri electorate, but rather to note how the
successful politician reacts within his own sphere.
An inquiry into Truman's political career revealed that the
issue of Pendergast Ism played an important role in the 1940 Mis-
souri Democratic senatorial primary election. Chapter I Is an
attempt to indicate the major reasons for Thomas J. Pendergast f s
rise to the position of dominance In Missouri Democratic party
politics and to relate the causes for his eventual removal from
the political scene.
Chapter II is a background sketch of the three political
antagonists that vied for the senatorial nomination, Harry S.
Truman, Lloyd Crow Stark, and Maurice Morton Milllgan. This
chapter also shows the relationship which each of the candidates
had with Pendergast.
Chapter III is concerned with actual situations and cir-
cumstances of the campaign and how each candidate reacted to
these realities.
The conclusion states that Truman acted as a political
realist and that he was cognizant of the fact that Issues and
personal attacks alone do not determine elections. Truman
realized that the delivery of the vote was essential and it was
to this end that he concentrated his major efforts. Truman did
not permit the issue of Pendergast ism to dominate his own cam-
paign. He realized that charges of guilt by association were
being leveled at him by his opponents, but he refused to become
involved In a series of denials. Truman permitted his adversaries
to run against Pendergast, while he decided to secure the nomina-
tion on the strength of his Senate record.
